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XXXIII. *On the Philosophy of the Hindus. Part IV.* By HENRY
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Read February 3, 1827.

ON INDIAN SECTARIES.

IN the present essay, it is my intention to treat of the heretical systems of JINA and BUDDHA, as proposed in the first essay of this series on the philosophy of the Hindus; and to notice certain other Indian sects, which, like them, exhibit some analogy to the *Sānc'hyas*, or followers of CAPILA or of PATANJALI.

The theological or metaphysical opinions of those sectaries, apart from and exclusive of mythology and ritual ceremonies, may be not inaptly considered as a branch of philosophy, though constituting the essence of their religion, comprehending not only their belief as to the divinity and a future state, but also certain observances to be practised in furtherance of the prescribed means for attaining perpetual bliss: which here, as with most other sects of Indian origin, is the meed proposed for true and perfect knowledge of first principles.

The *Jainas* and *Bauddhas* I consider to have been originally Hindus;* and the first-mentioned to be so still, because they recognised, as they yet do, the distinction of the four castes. It is true, that in *Hindus-thán*, if not in the peninsula of India likewise, the *Jainas* are all of one caste: but this is accounted for by the admission of their adversaries (CUMÁRILA BHAT'TA, &c.), who affirm that they are misguided *Cshatriyas* (Hindus of the second or military tribe): they call themselves *Vais'yas*. On renouncing the heresies of the *Jaina* sect, they take their place among orthodox Hindus, as belonging to a particular caste (*Cshatriya* or *Vais'ya*). The representative of the great family of *Jagat séph*, who with many of his kindred was converted some years ago from the *Jaina* to the orthodox

* As. Res., vol. ix. p. 288.

faith, is a conspicuous instance. Such would not be the case of a convert, who has not already caste as a *Hindu*.

Both religions of JINA and BUDDHA are, in the view of the Hindu, who reveres the *véda* as a divine revelation, completely heterodox; and that more on account of their heresy in denying its divine origin, than for their deviation from its doctrine. Other sects, as the *Sānc'hyas* and *Vaiśéshicas*, though not orthodox, do not openly disclaim the authority of the *véda*. They endeavour to reconcile their doctrine to the text of the Indian scripture, and refer to passages which they interpret as countenancing their opinions. The *mímánsá*, which professedly follows the *véda* implicitly, is therefore applied, in its controversy with these half heretics, to the confutation of such misinterpretations. It refutes an erroneous construction, rather than a mistaken train of reasoning. But the *Jainas* and *Bauddhas*, disavowing the *véda*, are out of the pale of the *Hindu* church in its most comprehensive range; and the *mímánsá* (practical as well as theological) in controversy with these infidels, for so it deems them, argues upon general grounds of reasoning independent of authority, to which it would be vain to appeal.

The *uttara mímánsá* devotes two sections (*adhicaran'as*) to the confutation of the *Bauddhas*, and one to that of the *Jainas*. They are the 4th, 5th, and 6th sections in the 2d chapter of the 2d lecture; and it proceeds in the same controversial chapter to confute the *Pás'upatas* and other branches of the *Máhés'wara* sect; and the *Páncharátra* a branch of the *Vaishnava*. The *Chárvácas* are alluded to incidently in a very important section concerning the distinction of body and soul, in the 3d chapter of the 3d lecture (§ 30). In the *púrva mímánsá*, controversy is more scattered; recurring in various places, under divers heads: but especially in the 3d chapter of the first book (§ 4).

The *Sānc'hya* of CAPILA devotes a whole chapter to controversy; and notices the sect of *Buddha*, under the designation of *násticas*; and in one place animadverts on the *Pás'upatas*; and in another, on the *Chárvácas*.

It is from these and similar controversial disquisitions, more than from direct sources, that I derive information, upon which the following account of the philosophy of *Jainas* and *Bauddhas*, as well as of the *Chárvácas*, *Pás'upatas* and *Páncharátras*, is grounded. A good collection of original works by writers of their own persuasion, whether in the *Sanscrīt* language or in *Prácrīt* or *Pálī*, the language of the *Jainas* and that of the *Bauddhas*,

is not at hand to be consulted. But, although the information be furnished by their adversaries and even inveterate enemies, it appears, so far as I have any opportunity of comparing it with their own representations, essentially correct.

SECT OF JINA.

The *Jainas* or *Ārhatas*, followers of JINA or ARHAT (terms of like import), are also denominated *Vivasanás*, *Muctavasanás*, *Muctámbaras* or *Digambaras*, with reference to the nakedness of the rigid order of ascetics in this sect, who go “bare of clothing,” “disrobed,” or “clad by the regions of space.” The less strict order of *Swétámbaras** “clad in white,” is of more modern date and of inferior note. Among nicknames by which they are known, that of *Lunchúta-cés'a* occurs. It alludes to the practice of abruptly eradicating hair of the head or body by way of mortification. PÁRŚWANÁT'HA is described as tearing five handfuls of hair from his head on becoming a devotee.†

According to the *Digambara Jainas*, the universe consists of two classes, “animate” and “inanimate” (*jíva* and *ajíva*), without a creator or ruling providence (*íśwara*).‡ They assign for the cause (*cáрана*) of the world, atoms which they do not, as the *Vais'eshikas*, distinguish into so many sorts as there are elements, but consider these, *viz.* earth, water, fire, and air, the four elements by them admitted, as modified compounds of homogeneous atoms.

These gymnosophists distinguish, as already intimated, two chief categories: 1st. *Jíva*, intelligent and sentient soul (*chaitana átmiá* or *bódhátmiá*) endued with body and consequently composed of parts; eternal: 2d. *Ajíva*, all that is not a living soul; that is, the whole of (*jad'a*) inanimate and unsentient substance. The one is the object of fruition, being that which is to be enjoyed (*bhógya*) by the soul; the other is the enjoyer (*bhóctá*) or agent in fruition; soul itself.

This second comprehensive predicament admits a six-fold subdivision; and the entire number of categories (*padári'ha*), as distinguished with reference to the ultimate great object of the soul's deliverance, is consequently seven.||

* Page 416 of this volume.

† Page 433.

‡ *Rámánuj* on *Br. Sûtr.*

|| *Sancara* and other commentators on *Br. Sûtr.* and annotators on their gloss.

I. *Jīva* or soul, as before-mentioned, comprising three descriptions : 1st. *nitya-siddha*, ever perfect, or *yōga-siddha*, perfect by profound abstraction ; for instance, *arhats* or *jinas*, the deified saints of the sect : 2d. *mucta* or *muctātmā*, a soul which is free or liberated ; its deliverance having been accomplished through the strict observance of the precepts of the *Jinas* : 3d. *baddha* or *baddhātmā*, a soul which is bound, being in any stage antecedent to deliverance ; remaining yet fettered by deeds or works (*carma*).

II. *Ajīva* taken in a restricted sense. It comprehends the four elements, earth, water, fire and air ; and all which is fixed (*st'hāvara*) as mountains, or moveable (*jangama*) as rivers, &c. In a different arrangement, to be hereafter noticed, this category is termed *Pudgala* matter.

III.—VII. The five remaining categories are distributed into two classes, that which is to be effected (*sādhya*) and the means thereof (*sādhana*) : one comprising two, and the other three divisions. What may be effected (*sādhya*) is either liberation or confinement : both of which will be noticed further on. The three efficient means (*sādhana*) are as follow :

III. *Āsrava* is that which directs the embodied spirit (*āsravayati puruṣam*) towards external objects. It is the occupation or employment (*vrītti* or *pravṛtti*) of the senses or organs on sensible objects. Through the means of the senses it affects the embodied spirit with the sentiment of taction, colour, smell and taste.

Or it is the association or connexion of body with right and wrong deeds. It comprises all the *carmas* : for they (*āsravayanti*) pervade, influence, and attend the doer, following him or attaching to him.

It is a misdirection (*miṭhyā-pravṛtti*) of the organs : for it is vain, as cause of disappointment, rendering the organs of sense and sensible objects subservient to fruition.

IV. *Samvara* is that which stops (*samvṛīṇōti*) the course of the foregoing ; or closes up the door or passage of it : and consists in self-command, or restraint of organs internal and external : embracing all means of self-control, and subjection of the senses, calming and subduing them.

It is the right direction (*samyac pravṛtti*) of the organs.

V. *Nirjara* is that which utterly and entirely (*nir*) wears and antiquates (*jarayati*) all sin previously incurred, and the whole effect of works or deeds (*carma*). It consists chiefly in mortification (*tapas*) : such as fasts, rigorous silence, standing upon heated stones, plucking out the hair by the roots, &c.

This is discriminated from the two preceeding, as neither misdirection nor right direction, but non-direction (*appravritti*) of the organs towards sensible objects.

VI. *Baddha* is that which binds (*badhnāti*) the embodied spirit. It is confinement and connexion, or association, of the soul with deeds. It consists in a succession of births and deaths as the result of works (*carman*).

VII. *Mócsa* is liberation; or deliverance of the soul from the fetters of works. It is the state of a soul in which knowledge and other requisites are developed.

Relieved from the bondage of deeds through means taught by holy ordinances, it takes effect on the soul by the grace of the ever-perfect ARHAT or JINA.

Or liberation is continual ascent. The soul has a buoyancy or natural tendency upwards, but is kept down by corporeal trammels. When freed from them, it rises to the region of the liberated.

Long immersed in corporeal restraint, but released from it; as a bird let loose from a cage, plunging into water to wash off the dirt with which it was stained, and drying its pinions in the sunshine, soars aloft; so does the soul, released from long confinement, soar high, never to return.

Liberation then is the condition of a soul clear of all impediments.

It is attained by right knowledge, doctrine and observances: and is a result of the unrestrained operation of the soul's natural tendency, when passions and every other obstacle are removed.

Works or deeds, (for so the term *carman* signifies, though several among those enumerated be neither acts nor the effect of action,) are reckoned eight; and are distributed into two classes, comprising four each: the first *ghátin*, mischievous, and *asádhu*, impure, as marring deliverance: the second *aghátin*, harmless, or *sádhu*, pure, as opposing no obstacle to liberation.

I. In the first set is:—

1st. *Jnyána varaṇīya*, the erroneous notion that knowledge is ineffectual; that liberation does not result from a perfect acquaintance with true principles; and that such science does not produce final deliverance.

2d. *Dars'ána varaṇīya*, the error of believing that deliverance is not attainable by study of the doctrine of the ARHATS or JINAS.

3d. *Móhaniya*, doubt and hesitation as to particular selection among the many irresistible and infallible ways taught by the *Tirt'hancaras* or JINAS.

4th. *Antarāya*, interference, or obstruction offered to those engaged in seeking deliverance, and consequent prevention of their accomplishment of it.

II. The second contains :—

1st. *Védanīya*, individual consciousness : reflection that “I am capable of attaining deliverance.”

2d. *Nāmica*, individual consciousness of an appellation ; reflection that “I bear this name.”

3d. *Gótrica*, consciousness of race or lineage : reflection that “I am descendant of a certain disciple of JINA, native of a certain province.”

4th. *Ayushca*, association or connexion with the body or person : that, (as the etymology of the term denotes,) which proclaims (*cáyatē*) age (*áyush*), or duration of life.

Otherwise interpreted, the four *carmas* of this second set, taken in the inverse order, that is, beginning with *áyushca*, import procreation, and subsequent progress in the formation of the person or body wherein deliverance is attainable by the soul which animates it : for it is by connexion with white or immaculate matter that final liberation can be accomplished. I shall not dwell on the particular explanation respectively of these four *carmas*, taken in this sense.

Another arrangement, which likewise has special reference to final deliverance, is taught in a five-fold distribution of the predicaments or categories (*asticāya*). The word here referred to, is explained as signifying a substance commonly occurring ; or a term of general import ; or (conformably with its etymology,) that of which it is said (*cáyatē*), that “it is” (*asti*) : in other words, that of which existence is predicated.

I. The first is *jivāsticāya* : the predicament, life or soul. It is, as before noticed, either bound, liberated, or ever-perfect.

II. *Pudgalāsticāya* : the predicament, matter : comprehending all bodies composed of atoms. It is sixfold, comprising the four elements, and all sensible objects, fixed or moveable. It is the same with the *Ajīva* or second of the seven categories enumerated in an arrangement before-noticed.

III. *Dharmāsticāya* : the predicament, virtue ; inferrible from a right direction of the organs. *Dharma* is explained as a substance or thing (*dravya*) from which may be concluded, as its effect, the soul’s ascent to the region above.

IV. *Adharmāsticāya* ; the predicament, vice : or the reverse of the

foregoing. *Adharma* is that which causes the soul to continue embarrassed with body, notwithstanding its capacity for ascent and natural tendency to soar.

V. *Acásásticāya*: the predicament *ácāsa*, of which there are two, *Lócácāsa* and *Alócácāsa*.

1. *Lócácāsa* is the abode of the bound: a worldly region, consisting of divers tiers, one above the other, wherein dwell successive orders of beings unliberated.

2. *Alócácāsa* is the abode of the liberated, above all worlds (*lócas*) or mundane beings. Here *ácāsa* implies that, whence there is no return.

The *Jaina* gymnosophists are also cited* for an arrangement which enumerates six substances (*dravya*) as constituting the world: viz.—

1. *Jīva*, the soul.

2. *Dharma*, virtue; a particular substance pervading the world, and causing the soul's ascent.

3. *Adharma*, vice; pervading the world, and causing the soul's continuance with body.

4. *Pudgala*, matter; substance having colour, odour, savour, and tactility; as wind, fire, water, and earth: either atoms, or aggregates of atoms; individual body, collective worlds, &c.

5. *Cāla*, time: a particular substance, which is practically treated, as past, present, and future.

6. *A'cāsa*, a region, one, and infinite.

To reconcile the concurrence of opposite qualities in the same subject at different times, and in different substances at the same times, the *Jainas* assume seven cases deemed by them apposite for obviating the difficulty (*bhanga-naya*): 1st. May be, it is; [somehow, in some measure, it so is]: 2d. May be, it is not: 3d. May be, it is, and it is not [successively]: 4th. May be, it is not predicable; [opposite qualities co-existing]: 5th. the first and fourth of these taken together: may be it is, and yet not predicable: 6th. the second and fourth combined: may be it is not, and not predicable; 7th. the third (or the first and second) and the fourth, united: may be it is and it is not, and not predicable.

This notion is selected for confutation by the *Védāntins*, to show the futility of the *Jaina* doctrine. 'It is,' they observe, 'doubt or surmise, not

* *Rámānuja* on the *Br. Sūtr.*

certainly nor knowledge. Opposite qualities cannot co-exist in the same subject. Predicaments are not unpredicable : they are not to be affirmed if not affirmable : but they either do exist or do not ; and if they do, they are to be affirmed : to say that a thing is and is not, is as incoherent as a madman's talk or an idiot's babble.*

Another point, selected by the *Védántins* for animadversion, is the position, that the soul and body agree in dimensions.† ‘ In a different stage of growth of body or of transmigration of soul, they would not be conformable : passing from the human condition to that of an ant or of an elephant, the soul would be too big or too little for the new body animated by it. If it be augmented or diminished by accession or secession of parts, to suit either the change of person or corporeal growth between infancy and puberty, then it is variable, and, of course, is not perpetual. If its dimensions be such as it ultimately retains, when released from body, then it has been uniformly such in its original and intermediate associations with corporeal frames. If it yet be of a finite magnitude, it is not ubiquitary and eternal.’

The doctrine of atoms, which the *Jainas* have in common with the *Baud-dhas* and the *Vais'éshicas* (followers of CANÁDE) is controverted by the *Védántins*.‡ The train of reasoning is to the following effect : ‘ Inherent qualities of the cause,’ the *Vais'éshicas* and the rest argue, ‘ give origin to the like qualities in the effect, as white yarn makes white cloth : were a thinking being the world's cause, it would be endued with thought.’ The answer is, that according to CANÁDE himself, substances great and long result from atoms minute and short : like qualities then are not always found in the cause and in the effect.

‘ The whole world, with its mountains, seas, &c. consists of substances composed of parts disposed to union : as cloth is wove of a multitude of threads. The utmost sub-division of compound substances, pursued to the last degree, arrives at the atom, which is eternal, being simple ; and such atoms, which are the elements, earth, water, fire, and air, become the world's cause, according to CANÁDE : for there can be no effect without a cause. When they are actually and universally separated, dissolution of the world has taken place. At its renovation, atoms concur by an unseen virtue, which occasions action ; and they form double atoms, and so on, to

* *Sanc. on Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 6 (S. 33).

† *Ib.* S. 34—36.

‡ *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. § 2 and § 3. (S. 11—17).

constitute air; then fire; next water; and afterwards earth; subsequently body with its organs; and ultimately this whole world. The concurrence of atoms arises from action (whether of one or both) which must have a cause: that cause, alleged to be an unseen virtue, cannot be insensible; for an insensible cause cannot incite action: nor can it be design, for a being capable of design is not yet existent, coming later in the progress of creation. Either way, then, no action can be; consequently no union nor disunion of atoms; and these, therefore, are not the cause of the world's formation or dissolution.

‘Eternal atoms and transitory double atoms differ utterly; and union of discordant principles cannot take place. If aggregation be assumed as a reason of their union, still the aggregate and its integrants are utterly different; and an intimate relation is further to be sought, as a reason for the aggregation. Even this assumption therefore fails.

‘Atoms must be essentially active or inactive: were they essentially active, creation would be perpetual; if essentially inactive, dissolution would be constant.

‘Eternity of causeless atoms is incompatible with properties ascribed to them; colour, taste, smell, and tactility: for things possessing such qualities are seen to be coarse and transient. Earth, endued with those four properties, is gross; water, possessing three, is less so; fire, having two, is still less; and air, with one, is fine. Whether the same be admitted or denied in respect of atoms, the argument is either way confuted: earthy particles, coarser than aërial, would not be minute in the utmost degree; or atoms possessing but a single property, would not be like their effects possessing several.

‘The doctrine of atoms is to be utterly rejected, having been by no venerable persons received, as the *Sānc'hya* doctrine of matter, a plastic principle, has been, in part, by MENC and other sages.’*

Points, on which the sectaries differ from the orthodox, rather than those on which they conform, are the subjects of the present treatise. On one point of conformity, however, it may be right to offer a brief remark, as it is one, on which the *Jainas* appear to lay particular stress. It concerns the transmigration of the soul, whose destiny is especially governed by the dying thoughts, or fancies entertained at the moment of dissolution, (see page 437 of this volume). The *védas*,† in like manner, teach that the

* *Sānc.*, &c. on *Br. Sūtr.* 2. 2. § 3 (S. 17.)

† *Br. Sūtr.* 1. 2. 1.

thoughts, inclinations, and resolves of man, and such peculiarly as predominate in his dying moments, determine the future character, and regulate the subsequent place, in transmigration. As was his thought in one body, such he becomes in another, into which he accordingly passes.

SECT OF BUDDHA.

The *Bauddhas* or *Saugatas*, followers of BUDDHA or SUGATA (terms of the same import, and corresponding to JINA or ARHAT) are also called *Mucta-cachhá*, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked. They are not unfrequently cited by their adversaries as (*Násticas*) atheists, or rather, disowners of another world.

BUDDHA MUNI, so he is reverently named by the opponents of his religious system, is the reputed author of *sútras*,* constituting a body of doctrine termed *ágama* or *s'ástra*, words which convey a notion of authority and holiness. The BUDDHA here intended, is no doubt the last, who is distinguished by the names of GAUTAMA and SÁCYA, among other appellations.

Either from diversity of instruction delivered by him to his disciples at various times, or rather from different constructions of the same text, more or less literal, and varying with the degree of sagacity of the disciple, have arisen no less than four sects among the followers of BUDDHA. Commentators of the *védánta*, giving an account of this schism of the *Bauddhas*, do not agree in applying the scale of intellect to these divisions of the entire sect, some attributing to acuteness or superior intelligence, that which others ascribe to simplicity or inferior understanding.

Without regarding, therefore, that scale, the distinguishing tenets of each branch of the sect may be thus stated. Some maintain that all is void, (*sarva s'únya*) following, as it seems, a literal interpretation of BUDDHA'S *sútras*. To these the designation of *Mádhya mica* is assigned by several of the commentators of the *védánta*; and in the marginal notes of one commentary, they are identified with the *Chárvácas*: but that is an error.

Other disciples of BUDDHA except internal sensation or intelligence (*vijnyána*) and acknowledge all else to be void. They maintain the eternal existence of conscious sense alone. These are called *Yógácháras*.

* Quotations from them in the Sanscrit language occur in commentaries on the *Védánta*: (the *Bhámati* on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 19.)

Others, again, affirm the actual existence of external objects, no less than of internal sensations : considering external as perceived by senses ; and internal as inferred by reasoning.

Some of them recognise the immediate perception of exterior objects. Others contend for a mediate apprehension of them, through images, or resembling forms, presented to the intellect : objects they insist are inferred, but not actually perceived. Hence two branches of the sect of BUDDHA : one denominated *Sautrāntica* ; the other *Vaibhāshica*.

As these, however, have many tenets in common, they may be conveniently considered together ; and are so treated of by the scholiasts of VYĀSA'S *Brahme-sūtras* : understanding one *adhicaraṇa* (the 4th of the 2d chapter in the 2d lecture) to be directed against these two sects of Buddhists ; and the next following one (2. 2. 5.) to be addressed to the *Yógachāras* ; serving, however, likewise for the confutation of the advocates of an universal void.*

The *Sautrāntica* and *Vaibhāshica* sects, admitting then external (*bāhya*) and internal (*abhyantara*) objects, distinguish, under the first head, elements (*bhūta*) and that which appertains thereto (*bhautica*), namely, organs and sensible qualities ; and under the second head, intelligence (*chitta*), and that which unto it belongs (*chaitta*).

The elements (*bhūta* or *mahābhūta*) which they reckon four, not acknowledging a fifth, consist of atoms. The *Bauddhas* do not, with the followers of CAṆĀDE, affirm double atoms, triple, quadruple, &c. as the early gradations of composition ; but maintain indefinite atomic aggregation, deeming compound substances to be conjoint primary atoms.

Earth, they say, has the nature or peculiar character of hardness ; water, that of fluidity ; fire, that of heat ; and air, that of mobility. Terrene atoms are hard ; aqueous, liquid ; igneous, hot ; aërial, mobile. Aggregates of these atoms partake of those distinct characters. One authority, however, states, that they attribute to terrene atoms the characters of colour,

* This schism among the *Bauddhas*, splitting into four sects, is anterior to the age of ŚĀNCARA ĀCHĀRYA, who expressly notices all the four. It had commenced before the composition of the *Brahma-sūtras*, and consequently before the days of ŚĀBARA SWĀMÍ and CUMĀRILA BHAT'TA ; since two, at the least, of those sects, are separately confuted. All of them appear to have been indiscriminately persecuted, when the *Bauddhas* of every denomination were expelled from Hindust'hán and the peninsula. Whether the same sects yet subsist among the *Bauddhas* of Ceylon, Thibet, and the trans-gangetic India, and in China, deserves inquiry.

savour, odour, and tactility ; to aqueous, colour, savour, and tactility ; to igneous, both colour and tactility ; to aërial, tactility only.*

The *Bauddhas* do not recognise a fifth element, *ácasa*, nor any substance so designated ; nor soul (*jíva* or *átman*) distinct from intelligence (*chitta*) ; nor any thing irreducible to the four categories above-mentioned.

Bodies, which are objects of sense, are aggregates of atoms, being composed of earth and other elements. Intelligence, dwelling within body, and possessing individual consciousness, apprehends objects, and subsists as self ; and, in that view only, is (*átman*) self or soul.

Things appertaining to the elements, (*bhautica*), the second of the predicaments, are organs of sense, together with their objects, as rivers, mountains, &c. They are composed of atoms. This world, every thing which is therein, all which consists of component parts, must be atomical aggregations. They are external ; and are perceived by means of organs, the eye, the ear, &c., which likewise are atomical conjuncts.

Images or representations of exterior objects are produced ; and by perception of such image or representations, objects are apprehended. Such is the doctrine of the *Sautránticas* upon this point. But the *Vaibhásikas* acknowledge the direct perception of exterior objects. Both think, that objects cease to exist when no longer perceived : they have but a brief duration, like a flash of lightning, lasting no longer than the perception of them. Their identity, then, is but momentary : the atoms or component parts are scattered ; and the aggregation or concourse was but instantaneous.

Hence these *Buddhists* are by their adversaries, the orthodox Hindus, designated as *Purná*— or *Sarva-vainás'icas*, 'arguing total perishableness ;' while the followers of CANÁDE, who acknowledge some of their categories to be eternal and invariable, and reckon only others transitory and changeable ; and who insist that identity ceases with any variation in the composition of a body, and that a corporeal frame, receiving nutriment and discharging excretions, undergoes continual change, and consequent early loss of identity, are for that particular opinion, called *Ardha-vainás'icas*, 'arguing half-perishableness.'

The second head of the arrangement before-mentioned, comprising internal objects, *viz.* intelligence, and that which to it appertains, is again distributed into five *scandhas*, as follow :—

* *Rámánuj. on Br. Sútr.*

1st. *Rûpa-scandha* ; comprehending organs of sense and their objects considered in relation to the person, or the sensitive and intelligent faculty which is occupied with them. Colours and other sensible qualities and things are external ; and, as such, are classed under the second division of the first head (*bhautica*), appurtenance of elements : but, as objects of sensation and knowledge, they are deemed internal, and therefore recur under the present head.

2d. *Vijnyâna-scandha* consists in intelligence (*chitta*), which is the same with self (*âtman*) and (*vijnyâna*) knowledge. It is consciousness of sensation, or continuous course and flow of cognition and sentiment. There is not any other agent, nor being which acts and enjoys ; nor is there an eternal soul : but merely succession of thought, attended with individual consciousness abiding within body.

3d. *Vêdanâ-scandha* comprises pleasure, pain, or the absence of either, and other sentiments excited in the mind by pleasing or displeasing objects.

4th. *Sanjnyâ-scandha* intends the knowledge or belief arising from names or words : as ox, horse, &c. ; or from indications or signs, as a house denoted by a flag ; and a man by his staff.

5th. *Sanscâra-scandha* includes passions ; as desire, hatred, fear, joy, sorrow, &c. together with illusion, virtue, vice, and every other modification of the fancy or imagination. All sentiments are momentary.

The second of these five *scandhas* is the same with the first division of the second general head, *chitta*, or intelligence. The rest are comprehended under the second head, *chaittica*, appurtenance of intellect ; and under the larger designation of *âdhyâtmica*, belonging to (*âtman*) self. The latter term, in its most extensive sense, includes all the five *scandhas*, or branches, moral and personal.

The seeming but unreal course of events, or worldly succession, external and mental, or physical and moral, is described as a concatenation of causes and effects in a continual round.

Concerning the relation of cause and effect, it is to be premised that proximate cause (*hétu*) and concurrent occasion (*pratyaya*) are distinguished : and the distinction is thus illustrated in respect of both classes, external and personal.

From seed comes a germ ; from this a branch ; then a culm or stem ; whence a leafy gem ; out of which a bud ; from which a blossom ; and thence, finally, fruit. Where one is, the other ensues. Yet the seed is not conscious of producing the germ ; nor is this aware of coming from seed : and

hence is inferred production without a thinking cause, and without a ruling providence.

Again, earth furnishes solidity to the seed, and coherence to the germ ; water moistens the grain ; fire warms and matures it ; air or wind supplies impulse to vegetation ; ether expands the seed ;* and season transmutes it. By concurrence of all these, seed vegetates, and a sprout grows. Yet earth and the rest of these concurrent occasions are unconscious ; and so are the seed, germ, and the rest of the effects.

Likewise, in the moral world, where ignorance or error is, there is passion : where error is not, neither is passion there. But they are unconscious of mutual relation.

Again, earth furnishes solidity to the bodily frame ; water affords to it moisture ; fire supplies heat ; wind causes inspiration and respiration ; ether occasions cavities ;† sentiment gives corporeal impulse and mental incitement. Then follows error, passion, &c.

Ignorance (*avidyā*) or error, is the mistake of supposing that to be durable, which is but momentary. Thence comes passion (*sanscāra*), comprising desire, aversion, delusion, &c. From these, concurring in the embryo with paternal seed and uterine blood, arises sentiment (*vijnyāna*) or incipient consciousness. From concurrence of this with parental seed and blood, comes the rudiment of body ; its flesh and blood ; its name (*nāman*) and shape (*rūpa*). Thence the (*śad'-āyatana*), sites of six organs, or seats of the senses, consisting of sentiment, elements (earth, &c.), name and shape (or body), in relation to him whose organs they are. From coincidence and conjunction of organs with name and shape (that is, with body) there is feeling (*sparśa*) or experience of heat or cold, &c. felt by the embryo or embodied being. Thence is sensation (*védanā*) of pain, pleasure, &c. Follows thirst (*trīṣṇā*) or longing for renewal of pleasurable feeling and desire to shun that which is painful. Hence is (*upādāna*) effort, or exertion of body or speech. From this is (*bhava*) condition of (*dharma*) merit, or (*adharma*) demerit. Thence comes birth (*jāti*) or aggregation of the five branches (*scandhas*).‡ The maturity of those five branches is (*jarā*)

* So the commentaries on *Sancara* (the *Bhāmali*, *A'bharaṇa* and *Prabhā*.) But the fifth element is not acknowledged by the *Bauddhas*.

† See the foregoing note.

‡ One commentary of the *Védānta* (viz. the *'Abharaṇa*), explains *bhava* as corporeal birth ; and *jāti* genus, kind. Other differences among the *Védāntin* writers, on various minor points of the Buddhist doctrine, are passed over to avoid tediousness.

decay. Their dissolution is (*maran'a*) death. Regret of a dying person is (*śoca*) grief. Wailing is (*paridēvanā*) lamentation. Experience of that which is disagreeable is (*duḥc'ha*) pain or bodily sufferance. But mental pain is (*daurmanasya*) discomposure of mind. Upon death ensues departure to another world. That is followed by return to this world. And the course of error, with its train of consequences, recommences.*

Besides these matters, which have a real existence but momentary duration, the *Bauddhas* distinguish under the category and name of (*nirūpa*) unreal, false, or non-existent, three topics: 1st, wilful and observable destruction (*pratisanc'hya-nirōdha*) of an existent thing, as the breaking of a jar by a stroke of a mallet; 2d, unobserved nullity or annihilation (*apratisc'hya-nirōdha*); and 3d, vacancy or space (*ácás'a*) unencompassed and unshielded, or the imaginary ethereal element.

The whole of this doctrine is formally refuted by the *Védāntins*. 'The entire aggregate, referred to two sources, external and internal, cannot be; nor the word's course dependent thereon: for the members of it are insensible; and its very existence is made to depend on the flash of thought; yet no other thinking permanent being is acknowledged, accumulating that aggregate, directing it, or enjoying; nor is there an inducement to activity without a purpose, and merely momentary.

'Nor is the alleged concatenation of events admissible: for there is no reason of it. Their existence depends on that of the aggregate of which they are alleged to be severally causes. The objections to the notion of eternal atoms with beings to enjoy, are yet more forcible against momentary atoms with none to enjoy. The various matters enumerated as successive causes, do not account for the sum of sensible objects. Nor can they, being but momentary, be the causes of effects: for the moment of the one's duration has ceased, before that of the other's existence commences. Being then a non-entity, it can be no cause. Nor does one last till the other begins, for then they would be contemporaneous.

'The ethereal element (*ácás'a*) is not a non-entity: for its existence is inferrible from sound.

'Nor is self or soul momentary: memory and recollection prove it: and there is no doubt nor error herein; for the individual is conscious that he is the same who to-day remembers what he yesterday saw.

* *Sanc. Vāch.*, &c. on *Br. Sūtr.* 2. 2. (s. 19.)

‘ Nor can entity be an effect of non-entity. If the one might come of the other, then might an effect accrue to a stranger without effort on his part : a husbandman would have a crop of corn without tilling and sowing ; a potter would have a jar without moulding the clay ; a weaver would have cloth without weaving the yarn : nor would any one strive for heavenly bliss or eternal deliverance.*

To confute another branch of the sect of BUDDHA, the *Védântins* argue, that ‘ the untruth or non-existence of external objects is an untenable position ; for there is perception or apprehension of them : for instance, a stock, a wall, a jar, a cloth ; and that, which actually is apprehended, cannot be nonexistent. Nor does the existence of objects cease when the apprehension does so. Nor is it like a dream, a juggle, or an illusion ; for the condition of dreaming and waking is quite different. When awake a person is aware of the illusory nature of the dream which he recollects.

‘ Nor have thoughts or fancies an independent existence : for they are founded on external and sensible objects, the which, if unapprehended, imply that thoughts must be so too. These are momentary : and the same objections apply to a world consisting of momentary thoughts, as to one of instantaneous objects.

‘ The whole doctrine, when tried and sifted, crumbles like a well sunk in loose sand. The opinions advanced in it are contradictory and incompatible : they are severally untenable and incongruous. By teaching them to his disciples, BUDDHA has manifested either his own absurdity and incoherence, or his rooted enmity to mankind, whom he sought to delude.†

A few observations on the analogy of the doctrine, above explained, to the Grecian philosophy, may not be here out of place.

It has been already remarked, in former essays, that the *Bauddhas*, like the *Vais'eshikas*, admit but two sources of knowledge (p. 445 of this volume). Such likewise appears to have been the opinion of the more ancient Greek philosophers ; especially the Pythagoreans : and accordingly OCELLUS, in the beginning of his treatise on the universe, declares that he has written such things, concerning the nature of the universe, as he learned from nature itself by manifest signs, and conjectured as probable, by thought

* *Sanc.* and other Com. on *Br. Sûtr.* 2. 2. § 4 (s. 18-27).

† Com. on *Br. Sûtr.* 2. 2. § 5 (s. 28-32).

through reasoning ; thereby intimating, as is remarked by his annotator, that the means of knowledge are two.*

Concerning the atomic doctrine, maintained not only by the *Vaisés'hicas*, or followers of CANÁDE, surnamed CÁS'YAPA,† but by the sect of BUDDHA, and likewise by several others as well heterodox as orthodox, no person needs to be told, that a similar doctrine was maintained by many among the ancient Greek philosophers ; and in particular by Leucippus (if not previously by Moschus), and after him by Democritus ; and likewise by Empedocles, who was of the Pythagorean school. They disagreed, as the Indian philosophers likewise do, respecting the number of elements or different kinds of atoms. Empedocles admitted five, developed in the following order : ether, fire, earth, water, and air. Here we have the five elements (*bhúta*) of the Hindus, including *ácás'a*. The great multitude of philosophers, however, restricted the number of elements to four ; in which respect they agree with the *Jainas*, *Bauddhas*, *Chárvácas* and some other sectaries, who reject the fifth element affirmed by the Hindus in general, and especially by the orthodox.

In published accounts of the religious opinions of *Bauddhas* and *Jainas*, derived principally from oral information, doubts have been expressed as to the sense attached by them to the terms which they use to signify the happy state at which the perfect saints arrive. It has been questioned whether annihilation, or what other condition short of such absolute extinction, is meant to be described.

Both these sects, like most others of Indian origin, propose for the grand object to which man should aspire, the attainment of a final happy state, from which there is no return.

* Opusc. Mytholog. phys. and eth. p. 505.

† A remark may be here made, which was omitted in its proper place (Part 2 of this essay), that the followers of the atomic sect are sometimes contumeliously designated by their orthodox opponents, as *Cán'abhuj* (*a*) or *Cán'abhacsha*, in allusion to the founder's name. *Cán'a* signifies a crow ; and the import of *Cán'a-bhuj*, synonymous with *Cán'ád*, is crow-eater (*cán'a-ad*). The original name, however, is derivable from *can'a* little, (with *ad* to eat, or *ádú*, to receive) implying abstemiousness or disinterestedness of the person bearing the name. Conformably with the first of those derivations, CANÁDE himself is sometimes called *Can'abhacsha* or *Can'abhuj*.

All concur in assigning to its attainment the same term, *mukti* or *mócsha*, with some shades of difference in the interpretation of the word : as emancipation ; deliverance from evil ; liberation from worldly bonds ; relief from further transmigration, &c.

Many other terms are in use, as synonymous with it ; and so employed by all or nearly all of these sects ; to express a state of final release from the world : such as *amrita*, immortality ; *apavarga*, conclusion, completion, or abandonment ; *s'réyas*, excellence ; *nih s'réyasa*, assured excellence, perfection ; *caitwalya*, singleness ; *nih saran'a*, exit, departure. But the term, which the *Bauddhas*, as well as *Jainas*, more particularly affect, and which however is also used by the rest, is *nirván'a*, profound calm. In its ordinary acceptation, as an adjective, it signifies extinct, as a fire which is gone out ; set, as a luminary which has gone down ; defunct, as a saint who has passed away : its etymology is from *vá*, to blow as wind, with the preposition *nir* used in a negative sense : it means calm and unruffled. The notion which is attached to the word, in the acceptation now under consideration, is that of perfect apathy. It is a condition of unmixed tranquil happiness or extacy (*ánanda*). Other terms (as *suc'ha*, *móha*, &c.) distinguish different gradations of pleasure, joy, and delight. But a happy state of imperturbable apathy is the ultimate bliss (*ánanda*) to which the Indian aspires : in this the *Jaina*, as well as the *Bauddha*, concurs with the orthodox *Védántin*.

Perpetual uninterrupted apathy can hardly be said to differ from eternal sleep. The notion of it as of a happy condition seems to be derived from the experience of extacies, or from that of profound sleep, from which a person awakes refreshed. The pleasant feeling is referred back to the period of actual repose. Accordingly, as I shall have occasion to show in a future essay, the *védánta* considers the individual soul to be temporarily, during the period of profound sleep, in the like condition of reunion with the Supreme, which it permanently arrives at on its final emancipation from body.

This doctrine is not that of the *Jainas* nor *Bauddhas*. But neither do they consider the endless repose allotted to their perfect saints as attended with a discontinuance of individuality. It is not annihilation, but unceasing apathy, which they understand to be the extinction (*nirván'a*) of their saints ; and which they esteem to be supreme felicity, worthy to be sought by practice of mortification, as well as by acquisition of knowledge.

Chárvácas and Lócáyaticas.

In my first essay on the Philosophy of the Hindus (p. 20 of this volume), it was stated upon the authority of a scholiast of the *Sánc'hya*, that CHÁRVÁCA, whose name is familiar as designating a heretical sect called after him, has exhibited the doctrine of the *Jainas*. In a marginal note to a scholiast of the *Brahma-sútras*, one of the four branches of the sect of BUDDHA (the *Mádhya mica*) is identified with the *Chárvácas*. This I take to be clearly erroneous; and upon comparison of the tenets of the *Jainas* and *Chárvácas*, as alleged by the commentators of the *Védánta* in course of controversy, the other position likewise appears to be not correct.

For want of an opportunity of consulting an original treatise on this branch of philosophy, or any connected summary furnished even by an adversary of opinions professed by the *Chárvácas*, no sufficient account can be yet given of their peculiar doctrine, further than that it is undisguised materialism. A few of their leading opinions, however, are to be collected from the incidental notice of them by opponents.

A notorious tenet of the sect, restricting to perception only the means of proof and sources of knowledge, has been more than once adverted to (p. 28 and 445 of this volume). Further research enables me to enlarge the catalogue of means of knowledge admitted by others, with the addition of probability (*sám bhaví*) and tradition (*aitihya*) separately reckoned by mythologists (*Pauránicas*) among those means.* The latter is however comprehended under the head of (*s'á bda*) oral communication. In regard to probability or possibility (for the term may be taken in this lower meaning) as a ground or source of notions, it must be confessed, that in the text of the mythologists (their *Puráñas*) a very ample use is made of the latitude; and what by supposition might have been and may be, is put in the place of what has been and is to be.

The *Chárvácas* recognise four (not five) elements, *viz.* earth, water, fire and wind (or air); and acknowledge no other principles (*tatwa*).†

The most important and characteristic tenet of this sect concerns the soul, which they deny to be other than body.‡ This doctrine is cited for refutation in VYÁSA's *sútras*, as the opinion of "some;" and his scholiasts,

* *Padártha dípicē.*† *Vārhaspatya-sútra*, cited by *Bhāscara*.‡ *Sancara* on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 2. and 3. 3. 53.

BHAVADÉVA-MIS'RA and RANGANÁT'HA, understand the *Chárvácas* to be intended. ŚANCARA, BHÁSCARA, and other commentators, name the *Lócáyaticas*; and these appear to be a branch of the sect of *Chárváca*. SADÁNANDA, in the *Védánta-sára*, calls up for refutation no less than four followers of CHÁRVÁCA, asserting that doctrine under various modifications; one maintaining, that the gross corporeal frame is identical with the soul; another, that the corporeal organs constitute the soul; a third affirming, that the vital functions do so; and the fourth insisting, that the mind and the soul are the same. In the second of these instances, SADÁNANDA'S scholiast, RÁMA-TÍRTHA, names the *Lócáyatanas*, a branch of the *Chárváca*, as particularly intended. No doubt they are the same with the *Lócáyaticas* of ŚANCARA and the rest.

‘Seeing no soul but body, they maintain the non-existence of soul other than body; and arguing that intelligence or sensibility, though not seen in earth, water, fire and air, whether simple or congregate, may nevertheless subsist in the same elements modified in a corporeal frame, they affirm that an organic body (*cáya*) endued with sensibility and thought, though formed of those elements, is the human person (*purusha*).*

‘The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu, chewed together, have an exhilarating property, not found in those substances severally, nor in any one of them singly.

‘So far there is a difference between animate body and inanimate substance. Thought, knowledge, recollection, &c., perceptible only where organic body is, are properties of an organised frame, not appertaining to exterior substances, or earth and other elements simple or aggregate, unless formed into such a frame.

‘While there is body, there is thought, and sense of pleasure and pain; none when body is not; and hence, as well as from self-consciousness, it is concluded that self and body are identical.’

BHÁSCARA-ÁCHÁRYA† quotes the *Vārhaspatya-sútras* (VRĪHASPATI'S aphorisms), apparently as the text work or standard authority of this sect or school; and the quotation, expressing that “the elements are earth, water, fire and air; and from the aggregation of them in bodily organs, there

* *Sancara*, &c.

† On *Br. Sútr.* 3. 3. 53.

results sensibility and thought, as the inebriating property is deduced from a ferment and other ingredients.”

To the foregoing arguments of the *Lócáyaticas* or *Chárvácas*, the answer of the *Védántins* is, that ‘thought, sensation, and other properties of soul or consciousness, cease at the moment of death, while the body yet remains; and cannot therefore be properties of the corporeal frame, for they have ceased before the frame is dissolved. The qualities of body, as colour, &c., are apprehended by others: not so, those of soul, viz. thought, memory, &c. Their existence, while body endures, is ascertained: not their cessation when it ceases. They may pass to other bodies. Elements, or sensible objects, are not sentient, or capable of feeling, themselves; fire, though hot, burns not itself; a tumbler, however agile, mounts not upon his own shoulders. Apprehension of an object must be distinct from the thing apprehended. By means of a lamp, or other light, objects are visible: if a lamp be present, the thing is seen; not so, if there be no light. Yet apprehension is no property of the lamp; nor is it a property of body, though observed only where a corporeal frame is. Body is but instrumental to apprehension.’

Among the Greeks, Dicæarchus of Messene held the same tenet, which has been here ascribed to the *Lócáyaticas*, and other followers of CHÁRVÁCA, that there is no such thing as soul in man; that the principle, by which he perceives and acts, is diffused through the body, is inseparable from it, and terminates with it.

Máhés'waras and Pás'upatas.

The devoted worshippers of *Śiva* or *Mahés'wara*, take their designation from this last-mentioned title of the deity whom they adore, and whose revelation they profess to follow. They are called *Máhés'waras*, and (as it seems) *Śiva-bhágavatas*.

The ascetics of the sect wear their hair braided, and rolled up round the head like a turban; hence they are denominated (and the sect after them) *Ját'ádhári*, ‘wearing a braid.’

The *Máhés'waras* are said to have borrowed much of their doctrine from the *Sánc'hya* philosophy: following CAPILA on many points; and the theistical system of PATANJALI on more.

They have branched into four divisions: one, to which the appellation of *Śaivas*, or worshippers of *Śiva*, especially appertains: a second, to which

the denomination of *Pás'upatas* belongs, as followers of *Pas'upati*, another title of *Mahés'wara* : the third bears the name of *Cárun'ica-siddhántins* ; but RĀMĀNUJA * assigns to this third branch the appellation of *Cálámuc'has* : the fourth is by all termed *Cápālas* or *Cápálicas*.

They appeal for the text of their doctrine to a book, which they esteem holy, considering it to have been revealed by *Mahés'wara*, *Śiva*, or *Pas'upati* ; all names of the same deity. The work, most usually bearing the latter title, *Pas'upati-sāstra* (*Mahés'wara-siddhánta*, or *Śivágama*) is divided into five lectures (*údhya*), treating of as many categories (*padār'thas*). The enumeration of them will afford occasion for noticing the principal and distinguishing tenets of the sect.

I. *Cáran'a*, or cause. The *Pás'upatas* hold, that *Is'wara*, the Supreme Being, is the efficient cause of the world, its creator (*cartá*) and superintending (*adhish'thátá*) or ruling providence ; and not its material cause likewise. They, however, identify the one supreme God, with *Śiva*, or *Pas'upati*, and give him the title of *Mahés'wara*.

II. *Cárya* or effect : which is nature (*pracríti*), or plastic matter (*pradhána*), as the universal material principle is by the *Pás'upatas* denominated, conformably with the terminology of the *Sánc'hya* ; and likewise *mahat*, the great one, or intelligence, together with the further development of nature, viz. mind, consciousness, the elements, &c.

III. *Yóga*, abstraction ; as perseverance in meditation on the syllable *óm*, the mystic name of the deity ; profound contemplation of the divine excellence, &c.

IV. *Vidhi*, enjoined rites ; consisting in acts, by performance of which merit is gained ; as bath, and ablutions, or the use of ashes in their stead ; and divers acts of enthusiasm, as of a person overjoyed and beside himself.

V. *Duhc'hánta*, termination of ill, or final liberation (*mócsha*).

The purpose, for which these categories are taught and explained, is the accomplishment of deliverance from the bondage (*bandha*) or fetters (*pás'a*), viz. illusion (*máyá*), &c., in which the living soul (*jíva* or *átmá*), by this sect termed *pas'u*, is entangled and confined. For it is here maintained, that *pas'us* (living souls) are individual sentient beings, capable of deliverance from evil, through the knowledge of God and the practice of prescribed rites, together with perseverance in profound abstraction.

* Com. on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 37.

The *Pás'upatas* argue, that as a potter is the efficient, not the material, cause of the jar made by him; so the sentient being, who presides over the world, is the efficient, not the material, cause of it: for the superintendent, and that which is by him superintended, cannot be one and the same.

In a more full exposition of their opinions * they are stated as enumerating under the heads of effects and causes, those which are secondary; and as subdividing likewise the heads of prescribed rites and termination of ill.

I. They distinguish ten effects (*cárya*): namely, five principles (*tatwa*), which are the five elements: earth, water, fire, air and ether; and five qualities (*gun'a*) colour, &c.

II. They reckon thirteen causes or instruments (*caran'a*); viz. five organs of sense, and as many organs of action; and three internal organs, intelligence, mind, and consciousness. These thirteen causes or means are the same with the thirteen instruments of knowledge enumerated by CAPILA and his followers, the *Sánc'hya*s.

III. *Yóga*, abstraction, does not appear to admit any subdivision.

IV. Enjoined rules (*vidhi*) are distributed under two heads: 1st. *vrata*, 2d. *dwára*.

To the first head (*vrata* or vow) appertains the use of ashes in place of water for bath or ablutions: that is, first, in lieu of bathing thrice a day; at morning, noon and evening: secondly, instead of ablutions for special causes, as purification from uncleanness after evacuation of urine, feces, &c.

To the same head belongs likewise the sleeping upon ashes: for which particular purpose they are solicited from householders, in like manner as food and other alms are begged.

This head comprises also exultation (*upahára*), which comprehends laughter, dance, song, bellowing as a bull, bowing, recital of prayer, &c.

The second head (*dwára*) consists of, 1st. pretending sleep, though really awake; 2d. quaking, or tremulous motion of members, as if afflicted with rheumatism or paralytic affection; 3d. halting, as if lame; 4th. joy, as of a lover at sight of his beloved mistress; 5th. affectation of madness, though quite sane; 6th. incoherent discourse.

V. Termination of pain (*duhc'hánta*) or deliverance from evil, is twofold: one is absolute extinction of all ills; the other is acquisition of transcendent

* *Vidhyábhara*na on *Br. Sútr.* 2. 2. 37.

power, and exercise of uncontrolled and irresistible will. The last comprises energy of sense and energy of action.

The energy of sense (*dr̥c-sacti*) varies according to the sense engaged, and is of five sorts : 1st. vision (*dars'ana*), or distinct and perfect perception of minute, remote, confused and undefined objects. 2d. (*śravana*) perfect hearing of sound. 3d. (*manana*) intuitive knowledge, or science without need of study. 4th. (*vijnyāna*) certain and undoubted knowledge, by book or fact. 5th. (*sarvajnyatwa*) omniscience.

Energy of action (*criyā-s'acti*) is properly single of its kind. It admits nevertheless of a threefold subdivision; which, however, is not well explained, in the only work in which I have found it noticed.*

The opinions of the *Pásupatas* and other *Máhés'waras*, are heretical, in the estimation of the *Védántins*, because they do not admit pantheism, or creation of the universe by the deity out of his own essence.

The notion of a plastic material cause, termed *pradhána*,† borrowed from the *Sánc'hya*s, and that of a ruling providence, taken from PATANJALI, are controverted, the one in part, the other in the whole, by the orthodox followers of the *Védánta*.

‘An argument drawn from the prevalence of pain, pleasure, and illusion in the universe, that the cause must have the like qualities and be brute matter, is incongruous,’ say the *Védántins*, ‘for it could not frame the diversities, exterior and interior, which occur: these argue thought and intention, in like manner as edifices and gardens, which assuredly are not constructed without design. Nor could there be opération without an operator; clay is wrought by the potter who makes the jar; a chariot is drawn by horses yoked to it; but brute matter stirs not without impulse. Milk nourishes the calf, and water flows in a stream, but not spontaneously; for the cow, urged by affection, suckles her calf, which, incited by hunger, sucks the teat; a river flows agreeably to the inclination of the ground, as by providence directed. But there is not, according to the *Sánc'hya*s and *Pásupatas*, any thing besides matter itself to stir or to stop it, nor any motive: for soul is a stranger in the world. Yet conversions are not spon-

* *Abharan'a* (§ 39) 2. 2. 27. The only copy of it seen by me is in this part apparently imperfect.

† That by which the world is accomplished (*pradhīyaté*), and in which it is deposited at its dissolution, is first (*pradhána*) matter.

taneous: grass is not necessarily changed to milk; for particular conditions must coexist: swallowed by a cow, not by an ox, the fodder is so converted. Or, granting that activity is natural to matter, still there would be no purpose. The halt, borne by the blind, directs the progress: a magnet attracts contiguous iron. But direction and contiguity are wanting to the activity of plastic matter. The three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which characterise matter, would not vary to become primary and secondary in the derivative principles of intelligence and the rest, without some external instigator whomsoever. Apart from the energy of a thinking being, those qualities cannot be argued to have a natural tendency to the production of such effects as are produced.*

‘The *Pásupatas*’ notion of Supreme God being the world’s cause, as governing both (*pradhána*) matter and (*purusha*) embodied spirit, is incongruous,’ say again the *Védántins*, ‘for he would be chargeable with passion and injustice, distributing good and evil with partiality. Nor can this imputation be obviated by reference to the influence of works; for instigation and instigator would be reciprocally dependent. Nor can the objection be avoided by the assumption of an infinite succession (without a beginning) of works and their fruits.’

‘Neither is there any assignable connexion by which his guidance of matter and spirit could be exercised: it is not conjunction, nor aggregation, nor relation of cause and effect. Nor can the material principle, devoid of all sensible qualities, be guided and administered. Nor can matter be wrought without organs. But, if the Supreme Being have organs, he is furnished with a corporeal frame, and is not God, and he suffers pain, and experiences pleasure, as a finite being. The infinity of matter and of embodied spirit, and God’s omniscience, are incompatible; if he restrict them in magnitude and number, they are finite; if he cannot define and limit them, he is not omniscient (and omnipotent).†

A further objection to the *Sánc’hya* doctrine, and consequently to the *Pásupata* grounded on it, is ‘its alleged inconsistencies and contradictions:‡ one while eleven organs are enumerated, at another seven only, the five senses being reduced to one cuticular organ, the sense of feeling. The elements are in one place derived immediately from the great or intel-

* *Sanc., &c. on Br. Sútr. 2. 2. § 1. (S. 1—10.)*

† *Sanc., &c. on Br. Sútr. 2. 2. § 7.*

‡ *Ib. 2. 2. § 1. (S. 2. and 10.)*

ligent principle; in another, from consciousness. Three internal faculties are reckoned in some instances, and but one in others.'

The grounds of this imputation, however, do not appear. Such inconsistencies are not in the text of *CAPILA*, nor in that of the *Cáricá*: and the *Védánta* itself seems more open to the same reproach: for there is much discrepancy in the passages of the *Véda*, on which it relies.

The point on which the *Pásupatas* most essentially differ from the orthodox, the distinct and separate existence of the efficient and material causes of the universe, is common to them with the ancient Greek philosophers before Aristotle. Most of these similarly affirmed two, and only two, natural causes, the efficient and the material; the first active, moving: the second, passive, moved; one effective, the other yielding itself to be acted on by it. Ocellus terms the latter γένεσις generation, or rather production; the former its cause, αἰτία γένεως.* Empedocles, in like manner, affirmed two principles of nature; the active, which is unity, or god; the passive, which is matter.†

Here we have precisely the *pracríti* and *cáran'a* of the Indian philosophers: their *upadána* and *nimitta-cáran'a*, material and efficient causes. The similarity is too strong to have been accidental. Which of the two borrowed from the other I do not pretend to determine: yet, adverting to what has come to us of the history of Pythagoras, I shall not hesitate to acknowledge an inclination to consider the Grecian to have been on this, as on many other points, indebted to Indian instructors.

It should be observed, that some among the Greek philosophers, like the the *Sánc'hyas*, who follow *CAPILA*, admitted only one material principle and no efficient cause. This appears to have been the doctrine of Heraclitus in particular. His *psigmata* correspond with the sheer (*tán-mátra*) particles of *CAPILA*'s *Sánc'hya*; his intelligent and rational principle, which is the cause of production and dissolution, is *CAPILA*'s *buddhi* or *mahat*; as his material principle is *pradhána* or *pracríti*: the development of corporeal existences, and their return to the first principle at their dissolution,‡ correspond with the upward and downward way, εὐδὲς ἄνω and εὐδὲς κάτω, of Heraclitus.§

I shall not pursue the parallel further. It would not hold for all particulars, nor was it to be expected that it should.

* Ocellus de Universo, c. 2. in Opusc. Mythol. p. 505. Cicero, Academ.

† Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. ix. 4. ‡ See p. 39 of this volume. § Laert. ix. 8 and 9.

Páncharátras or Bhágavatas.

Among the *Vaishn'avas* or special worshippers of *VISHNÚ*, is a sect distinguished by the appellation of *Páncharátras*, and also called *Vishn'u-Bhágavatas*, or simply *Bhágavatas*. The latter name might, from its similarity, lead to the confounding of these with the followers of the *Bhagavad-gítá*, or of the *Śrī-Bhágavata-purán'a*. The appropriate and distinctive appellation then is that of *Páncharátra*, derived from the title of the original work which contains the doctrine of the sect. It is noticed in the *Bhárata*, with the *Sánc'hya*, *Yóga* and *Pásupata*, as a system deviating from the *Védas*; and a passage quoted by ŚĀNCARA-ÁCHÁRYA seems to intimate that its promulgator was ŚĀNDILYA, who was dissatisfied with the *Védas*, not finding in them a prompt and sufficient way of supreme excellence (*para-s'réyas*) and final beatitude; and therefore he had recourse to this *s'ástra*. It is, however, by most ascribed to NÁRÁYAÑA or VÁSUDÉVA himself; and the orthodox account for its heresy, as they do for that of BUDDHA's doctrines, by presuming delusion wilfully practised on mankind by the holy or divine personage, who revealed the *tantra*, or *ágama*, that is, the sacred book in question, though heterodox.

Some of its partisans nevertheless pretend, that it conforms with one of the *s'ác'hás* of the *véda*, denominated the *Ēcáyana*. This does not, however, appear to be the case; nor is it clear, that any such *s'ác'há* is forthcoming, or has ever existed.

Many of this sect practise the (*sanscáras*) initiatory ceremonies of regeneration and admission to holy orders, according to the forms directed by the *Vájasan'eyi-s'ác'há* of the *Yajur-véda*. Others, abiding rigidly by their own rules, perform the initiatory rites, in a different, and even contrary mode, founded, as is pretended, on the supposed *Ēcáyana-s'ác'há*. But their sacerdotal initiation is questioned, and their rank as *Bráhma'n'as* contested, on the ground of the insufficiency of their modes unsanctioned by either of the three genuine and authoritative *védas*.

The religious doctrine of the sect is, by admission of ŚĀNCARA and other commentators of the *Védánta*, reconcileable on many points with the *Véda*; but in some essential respects it is at direct variance with that authority, and consequently deemed heretical; and its confutation is the object of the 8th or last *adhicaran'a* in the controversial chapter of the *Brahme-sútras* (2. 2. 8).

Yet RÁMÁNÚJA, in his commentary on those *sútras*, defends the super-

human origin and correct scope of the *Pancharâtra* ; the authority of which he strenuously maintains, and earnestly justifies its doctrine on the controverted points ; and even endeavours to put a favourable construction on BĀDARĀYAṆA's text, as upholding rather than condemning its positions.

VĀSUDĒVA, who is VISHṆU, is by this sect identified with *Bhagavat*, the Supreme Being ; the one, omniscient, first principle, which is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe ; and is likewise its superintending and ruling providence. That being, dividing himself, became four persons, by successive production. From him immediately sprung *Sancarshan'a*, from whom came *Pradyumna* ; and from the latter issued *Aniruddha*. *Sancarshan'a* is identified with the living soul (*jīva*) ; *Pradyumna*, with mind (*manas*) ; and *Aniruddha*, with (*ahancāra*) egotism, or consciousness.

In the mythology of the more orthodox *Vaishn'avas*, VĀSUDĒVA is CRISHṆA ; *Sancarshan'a* is his brother BALA-RĀMA ; *Pradyumna* is his son CĀMA (Cupid) ; and *Aniruddha* is son of CĀMA.

VĀSUDĒVA, or *Bhagavat*, being supreme nature, and sole cause of all, the rest are effects. He has six especial attributes, being endued with the six pre-eminent qualities of

1st. Knowledge (*jnyāna*), or acquaintance with everything animate or inanimate constituting the universe.

2d. Power (*s'acti*), which is the plastic condition of the world's nature.

3d. Strength (*bala*), which creates without effort, and maintains its own creation without labour.

4th. Irresistible will (*ais'warya*), power not to be opposed or obstructed.

5th. Vigour (*vīrya*), which counteracts change, as that of milk into curds, and obviates alteration in nature.

6th. Energy (*tējas*), or independence of aid or adjunct in the world's creation, and capacity of subjugating others.

From the diffusion and co-operation of knowledge with strength, *Sancarshan'a* sprung ; from vigour and irresistible will, *Pradyumna* ; and from power and energy, *Aniruddha*. Or they may all be considered as partaking of all the six attributes.

Deliverance, consisting in the scission of worldly shackles, is attainable by worship of the deity, knowledge of him, and profound contemplation ; that is, 1st. by resorting to the holy temples, with body, thought, and speech subdued, and muttering the morning prayer, together with hymns

and praise of *Bhagavat* the deity, and with reverential bowing and other ceremonies ; 2dly. By gathering and providing blossoms, and other requisites of worship ; 3dly. By actual performance of divine worship ; 4thly. By study of the sacred text (*Bhagavat-sástra*) and reading, hearing, and reflecting on that and other holy books (*purán'as* and *ágamas*), which are conformable to it ; 5thly. By profound meditation and absorbed contemplation after evening worship, and intensely fixing the thoughts exclusively on (*Bhagavat*) the deity.

By such devotion, both active and contemplative (*criyá-yóga* and *jnyána-yóga*), performed at five different times of each day, and persisted in for a hundred years, VÁSUDÉVA is attained ; and by reaching his divine presence, the votary accomplishes final deliverance, with everlasting beatitude.

Against this system, which is but partially heretical, the objection upon which the chief stress is laid by VYÁSA, as interpreted by S'ANCARA * and the rest of the scholiasts, is, that 'the soul would not be eternal, if it were a production, and consequently had a beginning. Springing from the deity, and finally returning to him, it would merge in its cause and be re-absorbed ; there would be neither reward nor punishment ; neither a heaven, nor a hell : and this doctrine virtually would amount to (*násticya*) denial of another world. Nor can the soul, becoming active, produce mind ; nor again this, becoming active, produce consciousness. An agent does not generate an instrument, though he may construct one by means of tools ; a carpenter does not create, but fabricate, an axe. Nor can four distinct persons be admitted, as so many forms of the same self-divided being, not springing one from the other, but all of them alike endued with divine attributes, and consequently all four of them gods. There is but one God, one Supreme Being. It is vain to assume more ; and the *Pancha-rátra* itself affirms the unity of God.'

A few scattered observations have been thrown out on the similarity of the Greek and Indian philosophy, in this and preceding portions of the present essay. At the close of the series, after treating of the *Uttara Mímánsá* and *Védánta*, a topic which should come next after the *Púrva Mímánsá*, and before this supplemental essay concerning sectaries, but which

* *Br. Sutr.* 2. 2. 8. (42—45). *Sanc.*, &c.

is at present reserved for ampler preparation, the consideration of the affinity of the Indian and Grecian philosophy will be resumed.

It may be here remarked by the way, that the Pythagoreans, and Ocellus in particular, distinguish as parts of the world, the heaven, the earth, and the interval between them, which they term lofty and aerial, λέγω δὲ μέσην, οὐρανὸν, γῆν, τὸ μετὰξὺ τούτων ὃ δὴ μετάρσιον καὶ αἰρίον ὀνομάζεται.*

Here we have precisely the (*swar*, *bhú*, and *antarísha*) heaven, earth, and (*transpicuous*) intermediate region of the Hindus.

Pythagoras, as after him Ocellus, peoples the middle or aerial region with demons, as heaven with gods, and the earth with men. Here again they agree precisely with the Hindus; who place the gods above, man beneath, and spiritual creatures, fitting unseen, in the intermediate region. The *Védas* throughout teem with prayers and incantations to avert and repel the molestation of aerial spirits, mischievous imps, who crowd about the sacrifice and impede the religious rite.

Nobody needs to be reminded, that Pythagoras and his successors held the doctrine of metempsychosis, as the Hindus universally do the same tenet of transmigration of souls.

They agree likewise generally in distinguishing the sensitive, material organ (*manas*), from the rational and conscious living soul (*jívátman*):† *βῦμος* and *φρην* of Pythagoras; one perishing with the body, the other immortal.

Like the Hindus, Pythagoras, with other Greek philosophers, assigned a subtle ethereal clothing to the soul apart from the corporeal part, and a grosser clothing to it when united with body; the *sucshma* (or *linga*) *śaríra* and *st'húla* *śaríra* of the *Sánc'hyas* and the rest (p. 32 of this vol.)

They concur even in the limit assigned to mutation and change; deeming all which is sublunary, mutable, and that which is above the moon subject to no change in itself.† Accordingly, the manes doomed to a succession of births, rise, as the *Védas* teach, no further than the moon: while those only pass that bourne, who are never to return. But I am here anticipating on the *Védánta*: and will therefore terminate this treatise; purposing to pursue the subject in a future essay, in which I expect to show that a greater degree of similarity exists between the Indian doctrine and that of

* Ocell. c. 3. in Opusc. Myth. p. 528.

† Empedocles. See Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. j. 1117.

† Ocellus. Opusc. Mythol. 527.

the earlier than of the later Greeks ; and, as it is scarcely probable that the communication should have taken place, and the knowledge been imparted, at the precise interval of time which intervened between the earlier and later schools of Greek philosophy, and especially between the Pythagoreans and Platonists, I should be disposed to conclude that the Indians were in this instance teachers rather than learners.